Trump, IRGC, WORLD AND THE PEOPLE OF IRAN

Donald Trump appears to be pursuing what he considers to be the most advantageous strategic objectives for the United States in its dealings with what remains of the Islamic Republic and, in particular, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (the IRGC).

Since the commencement of the military campaign on 28 February, President Trump and his administration have adjusted their position towards the IRGC--Not Iran--Iran is the country with 90 million people--on numerous occasions. These shifts appear to reflect the complex range of factors that any United States President must consider when responding to developments in one of the world's most strategically significant regions.

Among those considerations are the potential financial and economic consequences of military conflict in the Middle East, particularly in and around the Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial proportion of the world's oil and gas supplies are transported. The broader geopolitical implications of instability in the region, together with its effect on international markets, have necessarily influenced the administration's approach.

At the outset of the campaign, when senior IRGC figures suggested the possibility of closing the Strait of Hormuz, even if only rhetorically, the prospect generated significant concern among global energy producers, shipping interests, and financial markets. Any interruption to the flow of oil, gas, and commercial shipments through the Strait would have had immediate consequences for global supply chains, energy security, and economic stability.

From the perspective of many Iranians who oppose the current regime, there is nevertheless some encouraging news. Certain strategic objectives pursued by the United States appear to align with the aspirations of many Iranian citizens who seek greater freedom, political reform, stability, and democratic change within Iran.

However, at the same time, allowing the IRGC to remain the dominant force in governing Iran is neither desirable nor sustainable. The IRGC's long history of domestic repression and human rights abuses, including the violent suppression of protesters and the deaths of thousands of Iranians during periods of civil unrest, is well documented.

Most recently, during the nationwide protests of late 2025 and early 2026, millions of Iranians reportedly took to the streets across cities and towns throughout the country to express their opposition to the regime. According to numerous reports and opposition sources, the IRGC, together with its affiliated Basij forces and other security apparatus, responded with significant force in an effort to reassert control and suppress the demonstrations.

Many Iranians view these events as further evidence of the growing disconnect between the ruling establishment and the population it governs. They argue that continued rule by the IRGC is inconsistent with the aspirations of a substantial portion of Iranian society, which seeks greater political freedom, accountability, economic opportunity, and meaningful democratic reform.

Beyond its domestic conduct, the IRGC's activities have contributed to instability throughout the Middle East and have posed broader security concerns extending beyond the region. The continuation of the IRGC's influence presents risks not only to the people of Iran but also to regional security, European interests, and the national security interests of the United States and its allies.

Ultimately, the risk of disruption to global energy supplies and commercial shipping routes, combined with domestic political considerations, including the midterm elections in the United States, appears to have contributed significantly to President Trump's cautious and calculated approach throughout the campaign.

President Trump and his administration should avoid repeating what many regard as the mistakes of previous administrations in their dealings with the Islamic Republic and the IRGC. Successive US governments have often prioritised short-term diplomatic accommodation or temporary strategic objectives over addressing the underlying nature of the regime and its conduct. Such approaches have repeatedly enabled the Islamic Republic and the IRGC to consolidate power domestically, suppress dissent, and expand their influence throughout the region. From this perspective, any long-term strategy must be informed by the lessons of past engagement and recognise both the aspirations of the Iranian people and the broader security implications of continued IRGC dominance within Iran's political structure.

At the same time, the United States plainly has little appetite for a large-scale military intervention in Iran akin to those undertaken in Afghanistan in 2001 or Iraq in 2003. For obvious strategic, political, and historical reasons, bringing down the Islamic Republic or the IRGC through direct military intervention, in the same manner that the Taliban and Saddam Hussein regimes were removed, is neither a realistic nor a desirable option for the United States.

The more difficult challenge lies not in the removal of a regime, but in managing the consequences of its collapse. Any post-collapse scenario would be considerably more complex and potentially far more dangerous. As witnessed in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s and in the early years following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, the collapse of central authority can create a power vacuum in which ethnic, political, regional, and armed groups compete for influence, autonomy, or self-determination. In the Iranian context, such instability could quickly draw in neighbouring states, including Iraq, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, each pursuing its own strategic and security interests.

Such a scenario would create a major regional and international security challenge that no American or European administration could afford to underestimate. The unfortunate reality is that the Islamic Republic and the IRGC appear to understand this dynamic well. They recognise that the prospect of post-regime instability makes Western governments cautious, and they have often relied upon that concern to preserve their position despite their record of repression, violence, and support for proxy networks throughout the Middle East.

Accordingly, a more viable and sustainable approach may be to support the Iranian people themselves by encouraging the emergence of a credible political alternative, strengthening civil society, assisting independent media and communication networks, maintaining targeted pressure on the regime and IRGC leadership, and supporting those within Iran who seek democratic change. The objective should not be another foreign military occupation, but rather the empowerment of the Iranian people to determine their own future and peacefully dismantle the machinery of repression that has been used against them, including during the events of 8 and 9 January. Such an approach would avoid the mistakes of the past while recognising both the legitimate aspirations of the Iranian people and the complex realities of regional security.