Ayatollah: An Old Forward Player on Putin's Team

Another catastrophic political miscalculation was the Ayatollah's decision to assume the role of a forward player on Putin's team in his aggression against and invasion of Ukraine. This misstep has ultimately backfired, tipping the scales against them in Tehran.

In aligning himself as an enemy of the West and NATO, the Ayatollah miscalculated the broader implications of his support for Putin's ambitions. Once it became clear that the West had no choice but to take a firm stance against Putin at any cost, that hard decision inevitably extended to other region of critical interest, the Middle East. This misstep has further isolated the regime, with consequences still unfolding. 

Knowing this and in reaction to the shockwaves and domino effects of the events of October 7, the Ayatollah and his IRGC cronies shifted strategies dramatically. They removed the previous president, Raisi—though I must clarify that I am not a conspiracy theorist but always ask WHY the most important of the five—and brought forward a so-called reformist, current president Pezeshkian, along with a seasoned team of former president Rouhani's allies. Among them was Javad Zarif, initially floated as the face of the Foreign Office, and later, with some compromise, Abbas Araghchi, now the current Foreign Minister of Iran.

Zarif remained in the background as an adviser, yet his influence on international matters grew significantly. Despite not holding an official position, his diplomatic experience and connections allowed him to shape the discourse and strategy surrounding Iran's foreign policy, especially in relations with the West and key international players. His presence behind the scenes continued to play a crucial role in navigating the complexities of Iran's foreign relations.

This calculated maneuver aimed to reduce international pressure and buy time, as has historically been their approach when under immense strain from the West and the United States. However, this time, the tactic may not achieve the desired results.

Trump and his administration are fully aware of the Ayatollah's position, both domestically and now regionally. They understood that the Ayatollah's regime is already fragile, particularly in the wake of the "Women, Life, Liberty" civil unrest, the devastating economic collapse, the currency crisis, and widespread shortages of electricity and water. With ongoing sanctions, the threat of military action, and open discussions surrounding military strikes on the Islamic Republic's key deterrents, including its nuclear enrichment sites and ballistic missile programs, the regime is under immense pressure. As a result, figures like Mr. Araghchi, Zarif, and the so-called President Pezeshkian—if we can even call him that—have little to no influence at the table with the West, should any negotiations take place.

Considering all these factors, becoming an old player on Putin's team against Ukraine appears to be one of the Ayatollah's last critical mistakes before his inevitable downfall. By aligning with Putin, the Ayatollah not only further isolated his regime but also miscalculated the broader international consequences. His decision to side with Putin during the invasion of Ukraine only deepened the regime's vulnerabilities, both domestically and on the global stage, accelerating the path toward his eventual demise.

In the case of exerting military power to topple the Ayatollah's regime in Iran, the West would need to carefully consider several critical factors. The potential consequences could be far-reaching, not only for Iran but for its neighboring countries such as Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Afghanistan. The destabilisation of Iran could lead to significant regional security risks, including the rise of militant groups, economic disruptions, and a large influx of refugees.

Moreover, military intervention could create a power vacuum, possibly leading to internal conflicts and a prolonged period of instability. While the desire to remove the oppressive regime is understandable, the West must weigh the long-term effects of such an intervention, especially given Iran’s strategic importance in the Middle East.

One possible approach to reduce these risks could involve strengthening the movement within Iran for democratic reform and offering international support to Iranian civil society groups. The West could support non-military means such as economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and covert operations to weaken the regime, while promoting the vision of a secular and democratic Iran.

If the people of Iran were able to clearly demonstrate their capability to govern democratically and peacefully, ensuring the protection of human rights and the rule of law, the West might be more willing to provide support, avoiding the chaos and potential fallout of direct military intervention. In any case, the ultimate goal should be a peaceful transition toward a free, democratic, and stable Iran, free from the oppressive rule of the Ayatollahs.